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To the Dreamers. 



















I suppose I see a different world than you do. 
And the truth is what I see frightens me.  
I’m frighten because our enemies are no longer known to us. 
They do not exist on a map, they’re not nations, they’re individuals. 
Look around you. Who do you fear? 
Can you see a face, a uniform, a flag, NO! 
Our world is not more transparent now, it’s more opaque, it’s in the shadows. 
That’s where we must do battle.  
So, before you declare us irrelevant, ask yourselves …  
How safe do you feel?  
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Before we start, about the references in this dissertation, due to the limit of 
characters permitted, we choose not to indicate the “links”, that will refer to the papers, 
reports, news, articles and other relevant documents that we refer. 
We refer the reader to the “Bibliography” section of this dissertation, where you 



























































Inês Isabel Dias Nunes, Mestrado em Direito Internacional, Público e Europeu, 
Universidade Católica Portuguesa, submetida a 15 de maio de 2017: 
 
“I Target with My Little Eye; Drones and Targeted Killing under the Scope of Ius in 
Bello” 
 
Esta dissertação terá dois pontos que nos iremos focar: um, determinar a legalidade 
do uso de drones e das operações de “targeted killing” num contexto de conflitos armados; 
dois, pretendemos confrontar os requisitos teóricos com a atuação dos Estados, 
nomeadamente o programa de drones dos EUA, uma vez que é aquele que surge como o 
mais problemático. Nesta última parte, iremos abordar a prática de “Signature Strikes”, 
como uma das maiores críticas apontadas ao programa de drones americano, 
especialmente aquele levado a cabo pela CIA.  
 
No final pretendemos estabelecer duas ideias: a primeira, que DIH é capaz de 
regular a utilização de drones e as operações de “targeted killing”, sem ser necessário a 
criação de novos tratados ou convenções; e segundo, no que concerne esta questão, o 
problema não está nas regras existentes, mas no facto de a sua aplicação depender da 
vontade dos Estados. E parece-nos que os EUA não terão essa vontade.  
 
 
Palavras-chave: Targeted Killing, UAV, Drones, Signature Strikes, Programa de 












Inês Isabel Dias Nunes, Master in International, Public and European Law, 
Universidade Católica Portuguesa, submitted May 15 2017:  
 
“I Target with My Little Eye; Drones and Targeted Killing under the Scope of Ius in 
Bello” 
 
This master dissertation has two major focuses: one, to determine the legality of 
drones and targeted killing operations in armed conflicts, subjected to International 
Humanitarian Law; second, we intend to confront the theoretical conditions that we 
established to State practice, namely the US drone program, since it has been the most 
problematic. For this last section, we will discuss the practice of Signature Strikes as a 
great critic to the US is how they’re conducting their drone program, specially the one 
carried out by the CIA.  
 
 In the end we purpose to establish two things: the first is that IHL covers the use 
of drones and targeted killing operations, not requiring the creation of new treaties or 
conventions; and second, the need, when it comes to this subject, it’s not about the 
existing rules, but it is dependent on the Sates will to comply with them. And it seems 
that the US does not have that will.  
 
 
Keywords: Targeted Killing, UAV, Drones, Signature Strikes, CIA Drone 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS  
 
AP – Additional Protocol  
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency  
E.g. – For example 
EUA – Estados Unidos da América  
GC – Geneva Conventions 
IAC – International Armed Conflict 
IHL – International Humanitarian Law 
NIAC – Non-International Armed Conflict 
Op. Cit. – Opus Citatum 
US – United States (referring to the United States of America) 
UAS – Unmanned Aerial System 
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 















Technology has the capacity to amazes us.  Every day, many objects emerge that 
trigger our interest, especially when they are able to influence people’s lives in a 
significant matter.  
Wars have been, since the beginning of mankind, a motivation for the development 
of technology. States have sought new means and methods to make war, hoping to inflict 
maximum damage to the enemy, while saving their own resources. This has been 
achieved with the development of weapons, strategies and even means of transportation.  
 
After the attacks on 9/11, the US engaged in a relentless “crusade” that led the 
country to engage in a series of conflicts1, always with the ultimate goal to fight and 
eradicate terrorism and terrorist organizations.  
Due to the different challenges these conflicts present, the US took the lead and 
took drones from the surveillance world, where they emerged, to endow them with lethal 
capacity. Associated with targeted killing operations, they are a vital tool in US endeavors 
to fight terrorism.  
 
For the purpose of this work, we intend to take drones and targeted killing too 
determine their legality under the scope of International Humanitarian Law. It is 
important to us, to ascertain whether the means and methods that have been applied for 
nearly sixteen years are allowed in the course of an armed conflict.  
We will focus on situations and practices that involve the US’s drone program, since 
they are the State that is the most committed to use drones with lethal capacity, in and 
outside the battlefield.  
 
We start with the notions of targeted killing and drones, separately, to determine 
the objects of our analysis, what we envisioned when discussing these issues.  
Then, we will take on the main subject of our work. Since drones are here to stay 
and targeted killing seems to be a reality, even in the context of an armed conflict, it is 
important to determine what are the conditions in which this practice is lawful under IHL. 
                                                          
1 The US has carried on attacks in countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, Pakistan. However, not in all 
of these countries the hostilities raised to the level of an armed conflict. 
15 
 
From determining if drones comply with the requirement of precaution, or determining 
who is a lawful target to comply with the principle of distinction, these are vital questions 
to determine the lawfulness of the attack. 
For the last chapter, we will address one of the major critics associated with US 
practice, signature strikes, that are is related with other major concerns, such as the lack 
of transparency. Although this is not the main focus of our work, we believe that State 
practice must be confronted with legal theory, in order to evaluate the lawfulness of the 
attacks.  
 
 A few notes before we proceed. First, we do not intend to analyze the use of drones 
for targeting killing under ius ad bellum, meaning that it is not our place in this moment 
to determine if these attacks constitute self-defense from the US or if it is an attack against 
State sovereignty.  














                                                          
2 In this dissertation, we will only resource to data that comes from operations that we believe occurred 
during armed conflicts, as they are determined by IHL. 
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1. MEANS AND METHODS  
 
In November 2001, the US undertook the first recorded use of a drone in combat, 
when a Predator killed Mohammed Atef3. Since then, the use of armed drones has become 
a central feature when it comes to American intervention inside and outside the 
battlefield. In an effort to reach remote targets, avoid the spill of American blood, evade 
controversy surrounding the deployment of troops, and achieve optimal accuracy and 
efficiency when performing targeted killing operations, the US has relied more and more 
on drones to target, surveille and kill enemies in current armed conflicts4.  
Initially, they were primarily used for conducting intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance missions but now, they stepped up and play a noteworthy role in armed 
conflicts, representing a significant change in the way that targeting strategies and tactics 
to counter armed opposition groups are conducted. Now, they seem to have arrived in 
style and conquer American hearts, likely to expand in number as a result of several 
factors quite appealing like “the relatively low costs involved, shrinking overall defense 
budgets (…) the very low risk to United States personnel, the rapidly growing 
sophistication on (…) targeting”5. 
 
The term “Drone” has been generally adopted through the years, but it is not the 
most accurate when addressing the ones that have been used for military purposes. The 
US prefers the term Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), which comprise “not only the aerial 
vehicle but also the ground control station, the human operators, and the mobile 
containers used to transport the UAV’s and ground equipment”6.  
The DOD defines an UAV as a “powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human 
operator, … can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or 
recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload”.7  
                                                          
3 KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah, “Drone Warfare”, 1st Ed., Cambridge, Polity Press (2014); p. 19 
4 VOGEL, Ryan J., “Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict”, in Denver Journal of International 
Law and Policy, Volume 39, nº1, (2011); p. 3. 
5 ALSTON, Philip, “The CIA and Targeted Killing Beyond Borders”, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research, New York University School of Law (September, 2011), p.3.  
6 KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah (2014), op. cit., p. 19. 
7 O’Connell, Mary Ellen, “Unlawful Killing With Combat Drones – A case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009”, 
Notre Dame legal Studies Paper No. 09-43 (July 2010), p.2.  
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Drones8, that began as a surveillance “tool” for the CIA, turned out to be an 
important weapon for military operations. They are (at least for the purpose of this work) 
remotely piloted by a pilot, which means that they do not carry a pilot on board. Both the 
Predator9 and the Reaper10 are capable of surveillance (which is a valuable feature when 
conducting attacks against specific targets) and combat, serving as a killer and a scout11.   
 
The US is the most enthusiast of countries when it comes to the use of drones in the 
hostilities12, containing two parallel initiatives. One, public acknowledge or a “military 
version”13, is carried out by the US Armed Forces and mostly operates in recognized war 
zones, such as Afghanistan and Iraq; the second, is of a more covert nature (although it is 
currently public knowledge its existence) that is ran by the CIA14.  
O’CONNEL suggests that the two programs might not be so clearly separated. 
Although most of the facts about the drone campaign are classified, some evidence 
suggests “that all drone operations are ‘joint’ operations”15 with the military. 
The use of drones and the extensive coverage by the media about their effects, 
makes both of the programs susceptible to critics, one of them in common: there is a 
disturbing lack of information that they are willing to reveal, even the military program, 
considering that they are bound by IHL rules and the need of transparency in their actions. 
The Government choose to reveal little about targeting rules or what requisites are 
imposed for someone (or something) to be considered a legitimate target. 
                                                          
8 Although this is not the technical term that it’s used, for this dissertation we will maintain the term Drone, 
because it is the one that is more familiar and well known, although we will be referring to UAV’s, as they 
are described above. Also, we will focus our attention to the ones that have lethal capacity, such as the 
Predator or the Reaper.  
9 Also known as MQ-1B Predator is has been the one that is more used in US operations, especially the 
ones carried by the CIA. The Predator can be equipped with two Hellfire missiles and has a 24h flight 
endurance. It is use for close air support for ground troops, striking specific targets, and IRS missions. The 
fact that is has a “multi-spectral” targeting system, provides to the operator “a real-time full-motion system” 
that allows the pilot to have a live streaming of what is happening. See:  KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah 
(2014), op. cit., pp. 21 
10 Also known as MQ-9 Reaper. The Reaper, on the other hand, it is a more lethal weapon. It can carry, not 
only Hellfire missiles, but Paveway II and Join Direct Attack Munitions. It has only 14 hours of flight 
endurance and it has primarily a “hunter” role, not a surveillance one. See: KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah 
(2014), op. cit., pp. 21 
11 See, KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah (2014), op. cit., p. 24. 
12 Not only the US has a drone program, specially one with lethal capacity; Israel and the UK already 
possess the technology. However, none of them as shown, in practice, such enthusiasm like the American 
one. That is why we will focus or analyses on the US drone program. 
13 MAYER, Jane, “The Predator War”, The New Yorker, 26th October 2009 
14 CIA attacks occur primarily in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan, and they are covert operations.  
15 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen, “Drones Under International Law”, International Debate Series, Washington 
University Law, Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute (October, 2010), p.6. 
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Surrounded by even more secrecy is the CIA drone program, which was initiated 
during President Bush administration16. Authorized to perform attacks by Title 5017, the 
agency has the authority to influence conditions abroad “without the appearance or 
acknowledgment of a US government role” and do not require public disclosure18. The 
program is classified as covert, and the agency declines to provide any information to the 
public about “where it operates, how it selects targets, who is in charge or how many 
people have been killed”19. 
The reality is that many of the information comes from the media, government 
leaks, scholars or the work of a few investigative journalist20 that recover information 
directly from the places where the attack occurs.  
But, even if there is not an official and precise account, it is clear that the CIA was 
engaged in an “aggressive campaign to eradicate local and foreign militants”21.  
 
Even with all the secrecy surrounding both programs, the US never denied the role 
that drones play in their targeted killing operations22. The problem is the shortage of 
information about these operations or the way the attacks are conducted, although the 
American Government continuously reassure that the rules of engagement are not 
unlawful and fully comply with IHL. Yet, news reports, local statements and government 
leaks might contradict the official reports  
 
                                                          
16 MAYER, Jane, “The Predator War”, op.cit. 
17 Title 50, titled “War and National Defense,” governs how the US declares and conducts wars, and how 
it ensures national security. Composed of 43 chapters, the title touches on intelligence operations, 
espionage, military equipment and assets, emergency powers, and nuclear security, among other issues. 
See, http://www.americansecurityproject.org/fact-sheet-u-s-c-title-10-title-22-and-title-50/ 
18 KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah (2014), op. cit., p. 26 
19 MAYER, Jane, “The Predator War”, op.cit. 
20 For example, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has been mention as one of the most reliable sources 
when it comes to the results of Drones Attacks in various places.  
21 MAYER, Jane, “The Predator War”, op.cit. 
22 For instance, in 2010 Harold Koh, then legal adviser to the US Department of State, gave a speech where 





Commonly associated with the use of drones in the pursuit of known terrorists are 
targeted killing operations23’24.  
Targeted killing has become a common antiterrorism practice, especially after 9/11, 
having experienced a significant growth during President Obama’s mandate, emerging as 
“an effective means to disable non-uniformed combatants while sparing civilians many 
of the horrors of full scale battle”25.  
 
Almost sixteen years after the 9/11 attacks, there is no doubt that targeted killing 
has become an official US policy. Regardless, there is no generally accepted definition 
on targeted killing and even government publications dealing with the subject are not 
consistent.  
One that we might take in consideration containing several elements of IHL, defines 
targeted killing as “the intentional killing of a specific enemy combatant or civilian enemy 
fighter, who cannot reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in hostilities, 
the targeting done at the direction of the state, in the context of an international or 
noninternational armed conflict.”26  
 
Another notion is given to us by MELZER. The author defines it as: 
the use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the 
intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons 
who are not in physical custody of those targeting them27 
 
For the author, targeting killing “is a method of employing lethal force against 
human beings”, and the means to do so doesn’t necessarily need to be a weapon, there are 
other means to take a human life. So, “the notion of ‘lethal force’ must, therefore include 
                                                          
23 Many authors, like SOLIS, STERIO or BENSON, believe that are two forms of targeted killing that are 
being conducted. First, what is called Personality Strikes, are conducted against specific individuals, who 
are identified as posing a significant threat to the US and whose targeting has been approved by the 
President. Second, Signature Strikes represent the most controversial form of targeting, and we will mention 
them in more detail in the final chapters.   
24 Although it is the most known practice associated with drones that possess lethal capacity, it is not the 
only one.  
25 GROSS, Michael L., “Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an 
Age of Asymmetric Conflict” 118-21 (2010). Apud ALSTON, Philip, “The CIA and Targeted Killings 
Beyond Borders”, Harvard National Security Journal, NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper 
No. 11-64 (September 16, 2011), pp.6. 
26 SOLIS, Gary D., “The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War”, 2nd Ed., New 
York, Cambridge University Press (2016), p. 555. 




any forcible measure, regardless of the means employed, which is capable of causing 
death of a human being” 28.  
 
The two concepts complement and overlap each other ate the same time. Looking 
closer it is safe to assume that booth of them show some concern that targeted killing 
operations must be submitted to the laws of war. Also, booth indicate that this must be 
the last resort, when apprehension is not a valid option, and applying lethal force is the 
only solution.  
   
We will continue our journey by observing targeted killing and drones through the 
lenses of IHL and determine, first if IHL prohibits the use of drones for military purposes, 
and second in what conditions can we accept targeted killing as a lawful method of 




















                                                          
28 MELZER, Nils (2009), op. cit., p.3. 
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2.  UNDER THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
 
The starting point in this analyses occurs “under the umbrella” of IHL. Article 1 
common to the four GC provides that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect 
and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances”. And since most of 
the GC and AP provisions are International Customary Law, the norms might also be 
applicable to none signatory States.  
 
The majority of the US targeted killing operations occurred in non-international 
armed conflicts, where some of the IHL rules do not apply (mostly regarding detention). 
However, the core IHL rules respecting targeting are the same in international or non-
international armed conflict. These are rules like distinction, proportionality, military 
necessity and humanity29. These are the main rules that we will be mentioning when 
assessing the means and the methods of targeted killing operations.   
 
2.1. THE MEANS: DRONES IN THE BATTLEFIELD 
 
As wars evolve weapons tend to become technologically advanced, which usually 
arises some important questions.  
 
When it comes to armed conflicts the choice of means and methods of war falls on 
the parties of the conflict. However, this choice is not unlimited30 since IHL imposes 
some rules. When conducting the review on new weapons is important to determine 
“whether the weapon itself is banned or restricted by international law, and if not, whether 
the effects of the weapon are banned or restricted by international law”31. 
Potentially, the use of drones in the battlefield is uncontroversial under IHL, since 
there is not much practical difference between the “use of a Cruise missile or an aerial 
bombardment and the use of a drone equipped with explosive weapons”32. Even in the 
                                                          
29 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen (October, 2010), op. cit., p.21. 
30 Cf. Article 35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; 
31 BACKSTROM, Alan and HENDERSON, Ian, “New capabilities in warfare: an overview of 
contemporary technological developments and the associated legal and engineering issues in Article 36 
weapons review”, in International Review of the Red Cross, Vo. 95, Number 886 (2012), p.486. 
32 CASEY-MALSEN, Stuart, “Pandora’s box? Drone strikes under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and 




words of Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions said “in 
the exceptional circumstance of armed conflict, they may be legal”33. Whether or not the 
use or Drones is considered aggression or self-defense, if they take place in a situation of 
armed conflict they will be judge under international laws34. 
 
Evaluating the legality of a weapon system requires a multi-part analysis35. 
Weapons are subject to specific prohibitions that arise from treaty law, such as the ban 
on biological and chemical weapons, while others are regulated by customary law, such 
as poisoned weapons36. Every time that a new weapon emerges there is an “obligation to 
determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by 
this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable”37. 
 
Article 35 (2) in API prohibits the use of “weapons, projectiles, material and 
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering”38. 
This is also a requirement that amounts to customary law39, that mandates the use of those 
feasible means and methods of attack which will minimize harm to civilians, without 
sacrificing military advantage40.  
In the specific case of drones, we believe that this requirement does not refer to the 
drone itself, since it plays a role similar to jets or a F-16 (an aerial vehicle basically), but 
the missiles it carries. It has been said that Hellfire missiles41 have a very limited effect 
radius “since its explosive force is designed to penetrate forward into the target it is 
attacking” and when it comes to attack specific targets it is an important feature42.  
                                                          
33 CASEY-MALSEN, Stuart (2012), ob. cit., p. 606.  
34 Ibidem  
35 GLAZIER, David, Statement in the Hearing on “Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of 
Unmanned Targeting”, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh 
Congress, Second Session, April 2010, Nº 111-120, p. 29. 
36 Ibidem 
37 Cf. Article 36 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; 
38 Cf. Article 36 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977; 
39 CASEY-MALSEN, Stuart (2012), ob. cit., p. 607. 
40 SCHMITT, Michael N., “Drone Attacks Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the 'Fog of 
Law'”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Forthcoming, (March 2, 2011), p. 11. 
41 Hellfire Missiles are the ones most associated with drone attacks.   
42 SCHMITT, Michael N., “Unmanned Combat Aircraft Systems and International Humanitarian Law: 
Simplifying the Oft Benighted Debate”, 30 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, 
595-619 (2012), p.599. 
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While the assessment of this requirement is subject to different interpretations, it 
does not forbid “the killing or injury of opposing combatants” by means of missiles, so a 
drone launching Hellfire missiles is “equivalent to those traditionally employed from 
other platforms” and, therefore, not violating this rule43.     
The requirement to take precaution in attacks also mandate the use of means and 
methods that “will minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects”44. Is this aspect, 
drones, being a precise weapon with the ability of surveilling a target for a long period of 
time, might be able to provide less collateral damages compared to other systems, like 
artillery or ground attack45.  
 
When conducting attacks, drones afford an incredible range of capabilities and 
options available to the ones that possess the technology. SCHMITT highlights the 
advantages they offer, like diminish the occurrence of mistakes in attacks, by “enhance 
the ability to verify the nature of a target before striking it with other assets”46. Also, they 
provide “near real time” information about the target are for long periods, “without risk 
to the operators”, and with a better assessment of the possibility of collateral damage47. 
Further, they are “very accurate”, enhancing the rate of a successful strike48.    
 
Drones have been appointed by many as the weapon of the future, superior in many 
ways. 
SOLIS considers that drones are superior to manned aircraft, or even artillery, for 
several reasons: can gather photographic intelligence from areas that are too dangerous 
or inaccessible for manned aircraft; carries no risk of death or capture; their accuracy is 
greater, thus having the potential to reduce collateral damage49; and they do not “suffer 
from human weaknesses” like hunger, pain or fear50.  
SINGER calls the technology “worryingly ‘seductive’”, because it creates the 
perception of a costless war51. It is easy to understand the appeal of a “push-button”52 
                                                          
43 GLAZIER, David (2010), ob. cit., p. 29. 
44 SCHMITT, Michael N. (March 2, 2011), op. cit., p. 11. 
45 Ibidem 
46 Ibidem, p. 4. 
47 Ibidem. 
48 Ibidem 
49 SOLIS, Gary D. (2016), op. cit., p.550. 
50 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen (October 2010), op. cit., p.5 




approach when fighting terrorists, but the embrace of the drone program has occurred 
with little (or none) public discussion, given it represented “a radically new and 
geographically unbounded use of state-sanctioned lethal force”53.  
 
Since this is considered a “precision weapon” some might say that there is almost 
an obligation to use it. However, SCHMITT and WIDMAR explain that this statement is 
wrong and that the mandatory resource to this weapon might be “unfeasible, because it 
would require increased risk to ground forces in order to designate the target”, when other 
systems might have the same capability of reducing civilian risk, without sacrificing 
military advantage54.  
At this point, it can easily be argued that they might fulfil the requirements 
demanded by IHL. First, drones allow a real-time image of the target so that the absence 
of civilians near the target can be monitored; second, some of the targets are located using 
a device attached to the drone; third, in certain cases nearby military forces must also 
monitor the target; fourth missiles fired from drones are believed to have a smaller blast 
radius than other conventional munitions that might be deployed from jets55.     
These factors do not eliminate the risk of civilian lives being lost, but they can 
minimize it, complying with the principle of distinction.  If drones really enable a level 
of accuracy directed only against lawful targets, they could represent an adherence to the 
principle of distinction never before possible56. 
But the real innovation lays not in what they can do on their own, but in the way 
they connect, in the same platform, intelligence capabilities and the capacity to deliver 
precision attacks57. By linking intelligence with the ability to target opponents, drones 
enable a “contextually sensitive mechanism of targeting”, which, for example, allow 
pilots to delay attacks until the target distance himself from civilian population58.  
 
Regardless of the technological advantages drones possess, they are not immune to 
some criticism. They are not prepared for air-to-air combat; and they are not invulnerable 
                                                          
53 MAYER, Jane, “The Predator War”, op.cit 
54 SCHMITT, Michael N. and WIDMAR, Eric W, “'On Target': Precision and Balance in the Contemporary 
Law of Targeting”. 7 Journal of National Security and Policy 379-409 (May 16, 2014), p. 402. 
55 CASEY-MALSEN, Stuart (2012), op. cit., p. 607. 
56 ROTHENBERG, Daniel, “Drones and the Emergence of Data-Driven Warfare” in Drone Wars, 
Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy, Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, Cambridge 
University Press (2015), p. 449. 
57 Ibidem, p. 443 
58 Ibidem  
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to signal disruption or jamming59. This has not been a relevant problem so far because the 
countries where most of the attacks occur don’t possess the necessary technology to take 
advantage of this flaw60.       
Related with the image that drones provide, a technological constrain that has been 
mentioned by some scholars is, what could be called, “the soda straw effect”61. This 
argument warns us that relying solely on the drone camera might lead to some problems 
in target identification, since looking through a drone camera “is somewhat like looking 
through a soda straw”, meaning that the image might become distorted, making it difficult 
to distinguish individuals62. Also, when zooming in on a target, it loses a wider picture of 
the area, losing the ability to see if there are civilians around as well63.  
It has been also disputed that Drones technical precision is not as accurate as one 
might think, despite the praises from the US military forces and Government. Software 
companies that developed the software used in targeting say that latency reduces the 
precision of the attacks. This means that there might be a delay between movement on 
the ground and the arrival of the video image to the drone pilot64. 
Even if this latency is minimal, and most likely already adjusted given the rapid 
developments in drone technology (turning the image more precise) casualties and 
damages might not confine to the specific target, some argue that Hellfire missiles blast 
radius can extend anywhere from 15-20 meters65, which implies a necessary evaluation 
of the surroundings. They have no defensive capabilities, they can maneuver well to avoid 
attacks, their performance can be affected by bad weather or their communication systems 
experience problems and delays66. 
 
When it comes to the principle of proportionality, there has also been some 
concerns, that originate from the media, that has been reporting high numbers of civilian 
casualties. Nonetheless, the existence of the principle acknowledges that “attacks may in 
                                                          
59 KAAG, John & KREPS, Sarah (2014), op. cit., p. 25 
60 Ibidem 
61 HOLEWINSKI, Sarah, “Just Trust Us: The Need to Know More About the Civilian Impact of US Drone 
Strikes” in Drone Wars, Transforming Conflict, Law and Policy, Edited by Peter L. Bergen and Daniel 
Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press (2015), p.57. 
62 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen (July, 2010), op. cit., p.6. 
63 HOLEWINSKI, Sarah (2015), op. cit., p.57. 
64 International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and Global Justice Clinic, “Living Under 
Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drones Practices in Pakistan”, September 2012, 
p.9 
65 Ibidem  
66  ROTHENBERG, Daniel (2015), op. cit., p. 445. 
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some cases be lawful even when there is absolute certainty that civilians will be killed or 
injured or that civilian property will be damage or destroyed”67. And proportionality is 
assessed from the perspective of the attacker68, and what for one might be considered 
proportional, bearing in mind the goal achieved, others might have a different 
interpretation. So, a proportional attack, using drones or not, must always be measured 
through a case-by-case analysis, just like when other means are employed.  
 
Some authors might even raise some concerns that the use of the technology is 
“weakening the barriers to killing”69. People feel comfortable with drones, not 
considering the killings carrying by them as a serious matter as killing carrying out by 
troops or piloted planes70, giving a sense there is “easy” to kill with drones.  
The fact that drones can be deployed without carrying the risk that a pilot might 
come home “in a body bag”, makes the decision easy, especially for political reasons71. 
Also, there are psychological factors, since some believe that the distance between the 
operator and the victim “makes the decision to kill easier”, since they are not at risk of 
retaliation72.  
 
Regardless the praises and critics that drones are subjected to, we must bear in mind 
(not only with drones but with any other vehicle or weapons) that “the weapon or weapon 
system used is completely irrelevant”73. Ultimately, falls on the operator to take constant 
care and attention in to sparing the lives of civilians. The decision to attack (still) falls on 
the human, not the machine.  
As CASEY-MALSEN says, “drones are only platforms, other weapons can be – 
and are – used, which may fall foul of the rules prohibiting the use of unlawful weapons 




                                                          
67 SCHMITT, Michael N. (March 2, 2011), op. cit., p. 10. 
68 Ibidem 
69 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen, “Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations”, Journal 
of Law, Information & Science; Notre Dame Legal Studies Paper No. 11-35 (August 19, 2011), p.20. 
70 Ibidem 
71 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen, (August 19, 2011), op. cit., p.21. 
72 Ibidem, p.23. 
73 SCHMITT, Michael N. (March 2, 2011), op. cit., p. 10. 
74 CASEY-MALSEN, Stuart (2012), op. cit., p. 614. 
27 
 
2.2. THE METHODS: TARGETED KILLING UNDER IHL 
 
Targeted killing has been a practice commonly associated with the use of drones 
for military purpose. Since it is a method used in the battlefield a few considerations are 
in order. 
 
For starters, an international or noninternational armed conflict must be in progress 
in order to be relevant under IHL. Without an ongoing conflict the targeted killing of an 
individual, including a terrorist, would be considered extrajudicial assassination, 
homicide and could be considered a domestic crime. It is the existence of an armed 
conflict that raises the right to lawful combatants to kill their enemies and to attack 
locations and objects vital to the development of the hostilities, including other State’s 
armed forces (in IAC) or nonstate actors, like armed groups or civilians who directly 
participate in the hostilities (in NIAC).  
Nowadays, it has been a practice mostly associated with targeting terrorists75, even 
outside the battlefields, which CASSESSE finds it justifiable. For example, if “suspected 
suicide bombers do not respond to summons or (…) where it is ‘manifest’ that they are 
concealing explosives on their body”76. For this he turns to ECHR and the standards 
applied in counter-terrorist operations. His analysis lays, first, in the observation of 
certain circumstances that when predominant in a specific context may affect the 
                                                          
75 One aspect to keep in mind, while we continue our work, is that targeted killing is associated with attacks 
to terrorist’s outside the traditional battlefields. In fact, it might be questionable to call these operations (the 
sort that targeted a specific individual) targeted killing in an armed conflict, since, if we are referring to 
lawful targets, it is simply a lawful attack. Targeted killing is indeed commonly associated with the resource 
to force by a state, e.g. the US, in persecution of known terrorists (lets no forget the infamousness kill lists).  
But this use of force in an international context is widely controversial. Even to invoke self-defense (see: 
article 51, UN Charter), as perceived by the ICJ is questionable, since terrorist attacks do not amount to the 
necessary requirement of “significant amount to force”. See: O’Connell unlawful (July 2010). 
The UN Charter does not directly regulate the use of force between states and non-state actors (especially 
ones that are not), which is concerning, due to the nature of today’s conflicts. This void does not exclude 
the enforcement of some international principles, applied to the use of force. In fact, that has been a current 
content of necessity and proportionality in ius ad bellum and ius in bello.  
Proportionality and necessity are not only requirements of legitimate self-defense, but they also have a part 
to play in the collective security system. As GARDAM claims, we also believe that “necessity and 
proportionality are firmly established as integral components of the law, in relation to the unilateral resort 
to force by States”. See: GARDAM, Judith, “Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States”, 
Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, (2004), p. 186 
The potential of proportionality and necessity to restrain unnecessary and excessive force must not be 
underestimated. The more suspicious the arguments presented to justify the attack, the more demanding the 
requirements become. See: GARDAM, Judith (2004), op.cit., p. 187 
76 MELZER, Nils, “Targeted Killing in International Law”, 1st edition, New York, Oxford University Press, 
(2009), p. 61. 
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standards by which lethal force might be lawfully used. Second, taking these 
circumstances into account, CASSESE does not make the criteria governing lawful 
targeting under IHL more flexible, but the requirements of precaution, necessity and 
proportionality of human rights law. 
 
We do not deny that this is a practice associated with targeting terrorists, sometimes 
outside battlefields. However, we will focus our attention to those who are considered 
lawful targets under IHL. And yes, these individuals possibly are also targeted because 
of their terrorist activities but, as O’CONELL says “acts of terrorism do sometimes occur 
during armed conflict, permitting the use of lethal force against terrorists under armed 
conflict rules”77. 
 
For a better and constructed analyses, we will be dividing the next part in rules 
concerning the targets (who they are and how to qualify them) and then we will concern 
ourselves with the effects of the attack and the method employed.    
 
2.2.1. WHO CAN BE TARGETED?  
 
GLAZIER highlights a unique aspect of current drone strikes that is different from 
historic uses of force which is “the apparent deliberate long range targeting of specific 
individuals or small groups rather than physical objects of military value”78. And adds 
“there is nothing inherently problematic about selective targeting provided that the 
selected individuals are otherwise lawful objects of attack”79. 
As for the target, it must be a pre-determined specific one, so that it might be 
considered targeted killing. For instance, if the targeted person is not known in advance, 
or if his activities are not previously confirmed as unlawful, before the deployment of the 
drone, it is not targeted killing; it is simply a mission in search of a target. So, when enemy 
fighters or a group of enemy fighters are killed by a missile launched from the drone does 
not necessarily constitute a targeted killing80; it could simply be a strike that occurred 
during a specific mission or military operation, that required the drone’s assistance.   
                                                          
77 O’CONNELL, Mary Ellen, (August 19, 2011), op. cit., p.8. 
78 GLAZIER, David (2010), op. cit., p. 31. 
79 Ibidem 
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Targeted killings must contain elements of “intent, premeditation and deliberation 
to kill”81. Premeditation, since the targeted must be determined prior to the attack; intent 
and deliberation to kill since any accidental, unintentional or negligent death caused by 
the use of force will not be considered targeted killing.82  
On a more critical note, for KREMNITZER, targeted killing goes against the logic 
of “de-personalized warfare between collective entities” and that “personalization and 
individualization of military aims could cause the collapse of the conventional view of 
war and the justification for killing in its context”.83 However, he recognizes that the 
existing law regulating armed conflicts does not prohibit targeting a specific isolate 
individual, as long as is directed against an lawful target and doesn’t involve treacherous 
means. For this author, only self-proclaimed, unequivocal terrorist leaders (in the context 
of the “war on terror”) would be lawful targets (as civilians directly participating in 
hostilities). 
 
To constitute targeted killing, the object of the attack must be targeted because of 
his or her confirmed activities related to the conflict. If the targeted individual is a lawful 
combatant, uniformed and openly armed, as in an international armed conflict, he is an 
opposing combatant, so a lawful target with no further discussion necessary.  
If not a combatant but a civilian, as in a noninternational armed conflict, 
identification and confirmation of the target should be positive, so that it would be lawful 
under IHL84.  
International treaties and conventions do not provide clear criteria to established 
their status in the conflict. And, when the conflict is of a noninternational nature, is even 
harder. Even under the rules of IHL, “reprisal and punitive attacks on civilians” are 
forbidden, meaning that a targeted killing might only be lawful when targeting someone 
who is a legitimate target85.  
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So, international community has relied mostly on the Interpretive Guidance on the 
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities86 to determine who might be considered a 
legitimate target.   
As for the notion of civilians, the Interpretive Guidance starts by explaining that it’s 
a concept determined in a negative way, meaning that they are the ones that are not 
members in a State’s Armed Forces, members of armed groups, or participants in a levée 
en masse87’88.   
The ones that are part of the State’s armed forces, traditionally are determine 
through article 4(2) in III GC89 and the standards that the article gives us. However, the 
Interpretive Guidance calls our attention to the fact that this article defines post-capture 
requisites to ensure the protection of prisoners of war, it does not give us a definition on 
what is a member of the armed forces90. In fact, if someone fails to fulfil the requirements 
of article 4(2) III GC91, doesn’t necessarily means that they are civilians; they can still be 
part of the armed forces (and a lawful target). Even though they don’t get the status of 
prisoners of war, doesn’t automatically allows them to enjoy a more protectionist one.  
While it is generally accepted that members of armed forces do not qualify as 
civilians, the same cannot be said about members of an organized armed group, that are 
a part of the hostilities. 
For an organized armed group to be considered a lawful target under IHL they must 
be part92 of the conflict93, which means that they need to have a relation with one of the 
parties to the conflict94. This connection can be verified through the group’s actions, that 
must represent a clear indication that they are fighting for one side, in detriment of the 
other. Also, the group might make public announcements expressing their support to one 
side or the other.  
As for establishing the membership in these groups, it will depend on the 
individual’s role in it, and there is an unequivocally necessity to match the individual’s 
                                                          
86 For the purpose of this work, we will refer to this document as Interpretive Guidance 
87 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law”, (2009), p. 20. 
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conduct to the group’s position during the hostilities. This is an important requisite to 
determine if we are looking at an individual with a continuous combat function95, and 
consequently, a lawful target. It is a condition that helps distinguishing members of an 
organized armed group as a part to the conflict, from civilians who sporadically and 
spontaneously engage in the hostilities96.   
As for these civilians who take part in the hostilities, their protection stays on hold 
“unless as for such time”97 as they directly participate in hostilities, returning once they 
cease all activities related to the conflict98.  
The notion of direct participation in hostilities is a concept that ICRC says it is 
destined to civilian conducts during hostilities that lead to the suspension of their 
protection.  
The concept does not intend to determine a status, function or affiliation but only 
the commitment of a certain individual in the hostilities. There are three requisites that 
the Interpretive Guidance has established to determine if a certain civilian is engaging in 
the hostilities99.  
First, their actions must achieve a “threshold of arm”, meaning that they need to be 
able to cause considerable damages or disturb the enemy’s armed forces. In the absence 
of any damage, this requisite might be fulfilled if the act itself is likely to cause death, 
injury or destruction of infrastructures or individuals protected against direct attack.  
Second, it must exist a direct causation between a specific act and the damage 
inflicted; the damage must result from the act itself, or from a military operation in which 
this conduct is part of100. This conduct is expected to cause harm that reaches the threshold 
of harm in order to fulfilled the requisite.    
Finally, “belligerent nexus” requirement is fulfilled when “an act must be 
specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of harm in support of a party 
to an armed conflict and to the detriment of another”101. 
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All three requisites must be fulfilled in order to qualify civilian actions as DPH. In 
fact, as we can observe, all three contain elements of the others, which clearly indicates 
the direct link between them.  
SCHMITT calls our attention to three aspects related to the notion:  first, those 
civilians who participate directly in hostilities might be targeted as combatants; second, 
their death or injury will not be taken in consideration when accessing proportionality of 
the attack; and third when armed forces from a State are attacking, they don’t need to take 
any precautions considering the protection of those civilians who are participating 
directly in the hostilities102.  
 
Determine if we are targeting a lawful target under IHL might be complicated but 
it is needed, especially when theory comes to practice. During targeting operations, “the 
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants”103, 
in order to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties.  
In fact, this translates into the principle of distinction104, “it is the foundation on 
which the codification of the laws and customs of war rests”105.   
We can find the rule established in article 48 of API:  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives106. 
 
Even though this is an important rule, it’s sometimes conditioned by the 
circumstances of the hostilities and it is, in certain situations, confronted by the other 
principles. SOLIS107 give us a simple example: an enemy defense factory is a target even 
if the workers are considerate civilians. This is not a violation of the principle of 
distinction as any civilians killed are considerable collateral damage, since they were not 
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the intended target. If the targeting of the factory represented a military advantage and if 
the losses were not disproportional to that advantage, chances are it is a lawful attack. 
Many argue today, that the reality in most armed conflicts is different and that the 
principle of distinction is much harder to comply with. Many armed groups failed to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population, masquerading their belligerent 
status, making the task of distinction harder. In some situations, civilians might be used, 
by combatants, as shields, trying to avoid a direct attack. Because of this practice, the US 
is sometimes compelled to use force in area populated by civilians, requiring “to do all it 
can to ensure that it is targeting the right kind of individuals”108. For example, Taliban 
forces, doesn’t wear uniforms, “they are civilian individuals that were running around 
weapons, people dressed as civilians that were engaging our forces from that site”, which 
might indicate a violation of article 44(3) API that states “combatants are obliged to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack 
or in a military operation preparatory to an attack”109. This article shows that this 
precaution should be applied to both parties, an “inward-looking responsibility”110. 
In the specific case of Taliban, the lack of uniform was an insistent argument used 
by the US, to justify the difficulty to distinguish them, representing a danger for the 
civilian population. However, that might not be the intention behind the lack of uniform. 
As PEREIRA explains “the lack of uniform by the Taliban doesn’t translate in a planned 
strategy to be confused with the civilian population”111’112 taking advantage from the 
protection granted to the civilian population under IHL. The author justifies their conduct 
through a simple and yet logical explanation – they simply never wore uniforms – and for 
that reason it would be “ridiculous” to expect them to do so now113.    
In fact, article 44 (3) API foresees the existence of situations “where, owing to the 
nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself”114,  providing 
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different indications that it might be a lawful target during the hostilities, already 
predicting different behaviors from does in the traditional armed forces. 
We believe the assesse should not be black or white. Yes, it is true that Taliban 
forces do not, or ever, wore uniforms. But situations, like the use of human shields arises 
the necessity of a case-by-case analyses, and requires that other aspects might be taken in 
consideration when distinguishing civilians from combatants.     
 
When addressing specifically NIAC, APII addresses also the principle of distinction 
through article 13(2) stating that “The civilian population as such, as well as individual 
civilians, shall not be the object of attack”115. Again, civilian population in the broader 
sense, excluding those already mentioned.  
Violation of this rule, meaning a direct attack at civilian populations, even in an 
NIAC, constitutes a war crime under the Statue of the International Criminal Court116. 
Also, violations of this rule have been highly condemned by the international community, 
from States to the Security Council.   
 
2.2.2. THE ATTACK  
 
Targeted killing should be looked as a last resort, after all options were taken in 
consideration and when there is no feasible option of capture. Only when the capture and 
detention is impossible, should states resort to targeted killing operations. This is, in fact, 
more of a human rights law concern117, but a necessary one in our opinion. Targeted 
killing should be last resort, after all attempts and possibilities of arrest revealed to be 
unsuccessful or impossible. Also, we believe that it is safe to assume that, at the time of 
the attack, the individual in question cannot be under custody of those that are targeting 
him. 
The preference for capturing over killing, for ISSACHAROFF AND PILDES it’s 
a “departure from the traditional laws of war”, since enemy combatants can be killed even 
if they could be captured, unless they surrender or are considered hors de combat118. For 
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the authors, there is no obligation under IHL to differentiate “between soldiers whose 
treat can be neutralized by capture versus those who can be neutralized only by killing”119; 
meaning this could only be part of a legal requirement to justify targeted killings, or a 
merely policy rooted in strategic calculations, or even concerning moral considerations. 
There is also been argued that targeted killing should only be applied when the 
intended target “has a senior operational role”120, just as Attorney General Holder asserted 
when speaking about the terms in which a targeted killing should occur.  
Still, many scholars and human rights agencies believe that the contrary is in 
practice, suggesting that “the overwhelming percentage of those targeted are lower-level 
militants who do not have the capacity to plot effectively against the United States”121.  
 
Once determined the lawfulness of the targeted article 57 of API calls for “constant 
care … to spare the civilian population, civilians, and civilian objects”122. To take 
precautions in attack is an important requirement when conducting an attack. IHL requires 
for an attacker to do everything feasible123 to confirm that the individuals under attack are 
not civilians, protecting civilian lives. This standard requires attackers to “take those 
measures to avoid civilian harm that a reasonable attacker would take in the same or 
similar circumstances”124.  
To meet this requirement, any state that engages in targeted killing must at least, 
take precautions through “extensive intelligence gathering, preparing collateral damage 
estimates” or resourcing to other technologies, like “the use of a computer program to 
model the likely effects of a given weapon on a given target and the area nearby”125. This 
precaution extends not only to the attack itself, but also the preparations126.  
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The level of “legal certainty”127 required is not established by law. Some demand 
near absolute certainty defending that any attacker, facing a “slight doubt” about the 
target, should seek further information. Nevertheless, the reality in combat makes this 
demand impractical, especially in counterinsurgency battlefields “were the enemy 
deliberate uses the civilian population to disguise their activities”128.     
Also, attackers must warn civilian population that an attack will occur, unless the 
circumstances do not permit so, especially when it will result in “loss of operational 
surprise or increase risk to friendly forces is not required”129.  
So, as long as the attacker complied with the requirement and still believes that the 
target is a lawful one, there will be no issue regarding the lawfulness of the attack, under 
IHL130.  
 
When arm to civilians cannot be avoided, proportionality131 is the requirement that 
is called do determine the lawfulness of the attack. 
Article 51(2/2/b) AP I describes an unproportionate attack as “an attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian 
objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct military advantage anticipated”132. Article 57(2/b) AP I reinforces the necessity 
to protect civilian lives133, stating that “an attack shall be cancelled or suspended if it 
becomes apparent that (…) the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would 
be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”134.  
In the US Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency, the requirement of 
proportionality is not a precise copy from the norm in API, but reflects influences of IHL, 
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adding two positive commitments for combatants: preserve “noncombatant lives by 
limiting the damage they do”; and assume “minimal risk to minimize potential harm”135. 
Proportionality “is usually calculated in simple utilitarian terms: civilian lives and 
property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage gained”136.The last ones 
“seek to maximize the death of combatant enemies and maximize the destruction of 
enemy military objects, quite the reverse of their goal in regard to civilians”137.  
 
This principle, like any other, will require a case-by-case assessment. E.g, if a sniper 
is spotted in a desert high spot, with nothing and no one else around, he could be targeted 
and killed with a thousand-pound bomb. It would be a waste of munitions and a bit 
exaggerated, but it would not be a violation of the principle of necessity. On the other 
hand, if there is a sniper in a crowed orphanage killing him with a simple hand grenade 
would be a clear violation138.  
It will always depend on the balance between the losses of civilians predicted and 
the military advantage that the combatants are seeking. So, if the level of the military 
advantage raises, the number of civilian casualties predicted, even if higher, becomes 
acceptable.   
 
Any attack cannot be justified if it doesn’t represent a military advantage. The Field 
Manual on Counterinsurgency writes that the military advantage is not calculated in how 
many enemies are killed, but which enemies are killed139. This means, for the purpose of 
the calculous of proportionality in the attack, it will weight a lot more “how much harm 
the targeted insurgent could do if allowed to escape”140, than the number of enemies 
defeated.     
Article 52 (2) in AP I clearly requires that armed attacks must be “limited strictly 
to military objectives” and offer a “military advantage”141. The requirement of military 
necessity prohibits the targeted killing of an individual when “such killing is military 
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unnecessary, either because if offers no military advantage or because the targeted person 
could have been captured without unreasonable risk to the operating forces”142. It must 
also comply with the prohibitions of treachery.  
NATO defines the principle of military necessity as “the right to apply any 
measures which are required to bring about the successful conclusion of a military 
operation and which are not forbidden by the laws of war”143. The interpretation requires 
that military action be both necessary for the achievement of a legitimate military 
purpose, and not otherwise prohibited by IHL has been confirmed both in international 
jurisprudence and in contemporary legal doctrine144.   
However, military necessity doesn’t mean doing whatever it takes, because, to 
comply with the principle, all the actions must come with a significant military advantage 
and the weakening of the military enemy forces, while preventing collateral damages or 
disproportional civilian casualties. RUYS calls our attention to the fact that even in an 
armed conflict does not exist a “carte blanche” for the use of lethal force although IHL 
essentially permits the singling out and killing of an individual who is a lawful target145.  
The difficulty emerges when is required to determine what constitutes military 
necessity. SOLIS determines, as a starting point, that we must assume “good faith on the 
part of the commander”, and given the information available at the time of the decision 
the commander made the one that military necessity reasonably required them to do146.  
Still, the author points out that the test is not entirely subjective being extremely 
difficult to “apply judicial oversight to decisions taken in combat”147. There are a few 
important questions (that reflect the link between the four core principles) that one should 
make when accessing these decisions like “Did the commander take reasonable steps to 
gather information to determine (…) the legitimacy of the target, and that incidental 
damage would not be disproportionate?” or “Did the commander act reasonably in light 
of the information gathered?”148. 
Serious concerns also have been raised about erroneous targeting and incident 
casualties among the civilian population, which for us, reinforces the idea that the resort 
to targeted killing must be delimited by rigorous criteria.   
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Finally, only a senior military commander, representing the targeting state may 
authorize a targeted killing. It might be the president, or a senior domestic government 
official to whom the president has delegated targeting authority, such as the secretary of 
defense149. But it must be someone in the top of the military chain of command. This 
should never be a light decision to make; all the elements described above must be taken 
in consideration and IHL principles like proportionality, must always be at the top of an 
authorizing commander’s considerations, to avoid collateral damage. Also, and this is an 
important aspect to keep in mind, targeted killing should never be the main military 
strategy to a specific conflict, but an act to be taken in consideration in specific situations. 
As BEN-NAFTALI and MICHAELI puts it “while specific targeted killing might be 
lawful, a general policy of targeted killing cannot”150’151. 
This takes us back to the fact that only high value targets might be targeted, resulting 
in a great advantage to the counterpart.  
 
Overall, RUYS152 concludes that current international law governing the use of 
lethal force ensures a basic balance between the interests of State security, individual 
security and civil liberties, when properly implemented, since IHL provides a clear 
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3.  FROM THEORY TO STATE PRACTICE – SIGNATURE STRIKES 
 
So far, we can safely say that targeted killing using drones is legal under IHL, if it 
complies with the parameters established above. It has the undeniable potential to 
minimize civilian casualties, property damages and costs of war (either human or 
financial).  
However, when we look at the media or human rights organizations reports, the 
reality on drone strikes might not be as lawful as one might assume.  
 When confronting theory to U.S. practice many problems arise. From the 
inconsistent and yet high number of civilian casualties, property loss or displacement, 
there is indeed a lot of red flags being raised contradicting some of the praises that we all 
have heard over the years.   
 
One major issue that has been discussed is the resource to signature strikes, mainly 
by the CIA in their covert program.  
 
Signature strikes are appointed as a category of targeted killing, as well as 
personality strikes. These strikes are carried out against “suspected terrorists or militants 
whose identities are not known”, being targeted for their observed pattern of behavior that 
“would seem to indicate that they are involved in some militant/terrorist activity”153. 
For ROTHENBERGE, signature strikes represent a response to the “particular 
targeting demands of non-international armed conflicts”154, since in the absence of a 
clearly defined combatant status “targeting has to be based on information gathered and 
processed by the applicable laws of war”155.  
In this form of attack, drones play a “key role”, since they are capable of 
contributing with information vital for the analysis that will enable targeting decisions, 
while delivering precision attacks156.  
 
These strikes based on signatures deserve a second look due to some reports that 
state that signature strikes might make up a significant proportion of the covert drone 
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program, with a strong possibility that they constituted most of the strikes in Pakistan157. 
U.S. officials reported that most of the people on the CIA’s kill list have been killed in 
signature strikes, without the CIA’s certainty about who was the target158.  
This situation, if confirmed, exposes civilians to living under the constants fear of 
attack, since they don’t know what constitutes a signature behavior that could get them 
killed159.  
 
One example that sums up the problem has been provided by HELLER: “On 
February 4, 2002, a Predator drone operated by the CIA spotted three men standing in 
Zawhar Kili (…) one of the man was tall; the others were supposedly acting reverently 
toward him. Convinced that the men were legitimate targets – and hoping the tall man 
was Osama Bin Laden – the CIA fired a Hellfire missile from the Predator, killing all 
three instantly.” The man was not Bin Laden, and journalists determine that none of them 
were affiliated with al-Qaeda or Taliban.160 
Later, a Pentagon Spokesperson admitted that the “CIA had no intelligence 
indicating that the “tall man” was actually Bin Laden” but there was no indication that 
they were innocent locals.161They remained convinced that the men were “an appropriate 
target” even though they were not sure “who it was the drone had killed”162. 
  
The theory behind signature strikes is the individual’s pattern of behavior (basically 
a signature behavior), serving as a “proxy for determining either a continuous combat 
function” or if the individual is directly participating in the conflict163. This basically 
means that strikes might be directed at people who might demonstrate a behavior similar 
to those in organized armed groups or similar to civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities.  
So, what is considered a “signature behavior”? Basically, is a military-age male 
who bears “defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities 
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aren’t known”164. In fact, according to Daniel Klaidman, when the CIA’s Deputy Director 
clarified to President Obama what constitute a signature strike he explained “there are a 
lot of military-age males down there, men associated with terrorist activity, but we don’t 
necessarily know who they are”165. 
 
But let’s not be hasty judging this practice. There is, in fact, signatures behaviors 
that, when observed and confirmed by “on the ground” information, are not questionable, 
like signatures that exhibit involvement in planning and executing attacks. Basically, any 
signature that might reveal an involvement with the conflict, could lead to a lawful strike.  
The controversial cases are the ones that “involve individuals who exhibit 
signatures that do not clearly indicate membership in an organized armed group or direct 
participation in hostilities”166.Nevertheless, in practice, it has been quite hard to determine 
if these are behaviors that justify a lawful attack or not, since the U.S. does not disclosure 
what behaviors justify a signature strike167.  
 
Given the wide scope of activities that exposes individuals to being targeted by a 
drone strike due to a specific behavior, is possible that the requirements that constitute a 
signature have “been defined so broadly, and the definition of imminence expanded so 
greatly, that it serves as a poor proxy for direct participation or continuous combat 
function”168. For BENSON might not even be a question of a broad concept, but a cultural 
one since “suspicious behavior in the United States may not be suspicious in Pakistan”169. 
For example, a young man with weapons driving around in convoys may appear 
suspicious and his behavior might be a reason for a signature strike; however, in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas this behavior might not imply any unlawful activities that might 
end up select them as a lawful target under IHL170. 
 
These strikes are harder to justify under the law of armed conflict, because it is 
“uncertain whether they can adequately comply with the principles of distinction, 
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proportionality and precautions”171. Many lawyers argue that targeting an individual 
based on a set of activities that suggest some form of allegiance but are not linked to 
actual participation in hostilities may violate international law172.  
In fact, without no ground based intelligence, it is not very believable that drone 
operators alone, can “determine whether men targeted in signature strikes are not armed 
shepherds on their way to a market or locals patrolling their land”173, which is a normal 
behavior in some areas in Pakistan, for example. These behaviors, can only be confirmed 
as lawful, combining the use of drones with other intelligence sources and through 
continuous observation of an individual’s suspicious behavior174.  
Bearing in mind that their identity is unknown, these targeted individuals may be 
confused with civilians who cannot be directly targeted, and confirming their identity 
requires means that the U.S. might not possess, like personnel on the ground to 
investigate175’176. Even current and former governments might have suggested that 
signature strikes might lead to greater civilian casualties177. 
If proved lawful, they might raise issues about the targeting process that has been 
conducted, since they enable distinct and intrusive forms “of projecting power, that 
redefine the conditions under which individuals (…) are identified”178.  
 
HELLER provides us with a few examples on unlawful attacks that relied on 
signature behaviors. These are attacks on a “military age male in area of known 
terrorists”; consorting with known terrorists; armed men travelling in AQAP179 controlled 
area; and the existence of a suspicious compound180.  
These examples represent obvious violations on IHL principles. First, no one can 
be targeted simply because they are military-age males since it’s not the age that 
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determines someone’s involvement in the hostilities, it’s their confirmed actions, that are 
associated with one side or the other of the conflict. Without any further information, an 
attack on and individual based in these criteria is “plainly inconsistent with the principle 
of distinction”181.  
Also inconsistent with the principle of distinction is targeting an individual based 
on a signature such as consorting with known terrorists. An individual status cannot be 
determined just because someone is “consorting” with a legitimate target. Doesn’t qualify 
as DPH, since it doesn’t comply with the three requirements previously discussed, and it 
does not even rise to the level of indirect participation in hostilities, since it is not an act 
that contributes “to the war effort”, such as helping produce military equipment182.   
RUYS contends that “a membership approach” which means that all members of a 
certain organized armed group could be attacked, would be “too broad, because some 
members never engaged in hostilities”, leaving targeted killings to be permissible only 
when there are individuals preparing or engaging in an attack183. Considering this 
situation, individuals “run the risk of being collateral damage”184, due to the proximity to 
a lawful target. But they are not the targeted ones, therefore, if the attack complies with 
the principle of proportionality and all the necessary precautions were taken, there is no 
question about the legitimacy of the attack. 
Lastly, as for targeting trucks transporting armed man in areas controlled by 
organized armed groups or targeting compounds that might harbor combatant activities, 
it is again a signature that no reveals enough information to ensure that it is a lawful target. 
In the absence of additional information provided by other sources, the visual image that 
comes from the drone does not suffice. While operators can track such movements at a 
time, like continuous crossing the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the image 
alone does not provide adequate clarity as to the individuals’ status185. The mere image 
of someone carrying a gun or the suspicion that a compound is being used for military 
purposes does not suffice to establish a legitimate military objective186. An attack under 
these signatures would violate not only the rule of distinction, but also proportionality 
and military necessity. 
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Taking into account that most of the news and repots are referring to examples like 
the previous ones, it does not mean that all signature strikes might be considered illegal. 
HELLER points out that are indeed some signatures that are “legally adequate” under 
IHL. For the author planning attacks, transporting weapons, handling explosives, and 
attacks on Al-Qaeda compounds and training camps187 are adequate since they answer 
affirmatively to two questions. First, was the signature legally sufficient to determine the 
legality of the target? Second, was the evidence sufficient to determine if the “targeted 
individual was engaged in the signature behavior?”188 
In order to answer affirmatively to both questions, it will be required reliable 
information and on the ground sources. Meaning that to comply with IHL, signature 
strikes must rely on information gathered and processed by the applicable laws of war.  
Within the context of NIAC, ROTHENBERGE believes that targeting is “always a 
question of gathering intelligence, whether the data comes from informants on the ground, 
satellite imagery, or intercepted communications”189.  
 
There are significant issues with the resource to signature strikes in current 
conflicts. It is clear that errors have been made concerning target identification. Do to the 
uncertainty about the target behavior. In an published article, SHANE argues that “it has 
become clear that when operators in Nevada fire missiles into remote tribal territories 
(…) they often do not know who they are killing, but are making an imperfect best 
guess”190.  
Without knowing the evidentiary bases of the strikes, it is impossible to conclude 
that they violated the principle of distinction. They also suggest that the U.S. is willing to 
attack on the basis of evidence that is far from definitive191. In fact, there is a very famous 
“joke”, one which many scholars refer to, that says “when the CIA sees ‘three guys doing 
jumping jacks’, they think it is a terrorist training camp”192.  
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It is also an open question whether the U.S. is capable of accurately distinguish 
between member of organized armed groups and civilians who DPH193. This is important 
because the lawfulness of the target is determined by their status in the hostilities. For 
HELLER, is even unlikely that the U.S. attempts to make that distinction. Since the U.S. 
considers any military-age male in an area of known terrorist activity and any individual 
who consorts with known combatants to be a lawful target, which bears “little 
resemblance to long-standing principles of IHL”194. 
 
There is, of course, another major difficulty when accessing the legality of US’s 
signature strikes. We are talking about the categorically refusals to reveal the criteria used 
to perform such attacks, or even if there are signature strikes occurring, that relate to the 
media reports. To this day, it’s still not possible to determine with absolute certainty, that 
the U.S. requires evidence that is sufficient to justify signature strikes. Another issue is 
the amount of evidence necessary to determine that individuals are legitimate military 
targets. This is not clear and consensual, and in some cases, facing any doubt, absolute 
certainty might not even be required195.    
We are more inclined to look at this requirement through ICRC’s position that when 
facing even the slightest doubt about the status of the individual, it should be required 
from the attacker further investigation196.  
Many authors see this practice as violation of IHL, stating that as a result of the 
program’s secrecy, especially when conducting signature strikes, drone strikes are illegal, 
and that the lack of total transparency and an effective accountability mechanism means 
that the U.S. cannot fulfill its obligations under IHL197.   
 
There is one more problem that we must address, although it is not directly related 
with Signature Strikes, it is relevant since it demonstrates that one specific policy might 
influence a significant range of aspects in the drone program.  
Some believe that one of the causes for the inconsistent numbers of civilian 
casualties, between the US Government and Journalist’s reports, derives from the 
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possibility of different conceptions on what is a signature behavior198. If the US really 
considers “all military age-male” to be enough of a behavior to be targeted, the number 
of civilian casualties must be, indeed, very low.  
On the other hand, if these reports proven to be right in accusing the US of 
indiscriminate attacks, based on wrong assumptions about a civilian status, then there is 
a possibility that the principle of distinction as not been complied with, and that the 
numbers of civilian casualties is a lot higher.  
But in here lays the greatest issue when accessing these strikes. Without 
transparency and a clear policy about the rules of targeting that the CIA applies, there will 
always be uncertainty and assumptions.  
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Drones came and conquer a place in the conduction of hostilities. Capable of 
surveillance and attack they fit perfectly with targeted killing operations, due to their 
capabilities to scout and to kill.   
The following conclusions were drawn from this dissertation, and intend to 
summarize our views concerning this subject.  
I. Drones are not illegal under IHL. This should not even be questioned since, 
considering their function, there is no much difference between drones, helicopters 
or other combat aircraft, as so on. They are aerial vehicles that carry munitions and 
are those that give them a lethal capacity. In fact, since they are considered very 
precise, providing real time surveillance and attack, they are capable of enhancing 
the targeting abilities, reducing the probability of an unlawful attack.  
II. The Drone itself does not (and must not) have autonomy to engage in 
attack. The decision to strike relays on the commander in charge of the operation, 
especially if it amounts to targeted killing. This call must, and it’s never enough to 
highlight this, always come from a combination between cultural awareness, 
intelligence and real time image of the target. And one might ask, why cultural 
awareness? Because, as we demonstrated before, different societies have different 
interpretations on what is an acceptable behavior. For us, to see a man or women, 
carrying arms openly and patrol a specific area (without having any connection to 
law enforcement) it’s alarming. But the same might not be said in Pakistan or 
Afghanistan.  
III.  As for targeted killing under IHL, we believe that it deserves a lot more 
care and attention when determining the lawfulness of such operations, specially the 
requirements for such attack. But, ius in bello does not require to avoid targeted 
killings on lawful targets; if an individual is considered a lawful target under IHL, it 
can be killed. Simple as that.  
However, we believe that, when is possible, to opt for a capture operation, 
rather than a targeted killing one, since it might end up benefiting them. Some might 
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argue this is a human rights requirement, but for us, there is no need to kill an 
individual when capturing will lead to the same military advantage.   
IV. The rules governing armed conflicts are still actual and relevant. IHL 
provides an incredible range of rules and principles to guide the conduction of 
hostilities, from customary law, to the array of treaties and conventions related to this 
subject. So, we do not believe that there is need for a specific set of rules regulating 
targeted killing operations. The only thing required is to comply with the laws of 
armed conflict, while carrying these operations. 
To comply or not, depends entirely on the rules implemented by each States, 
and if those follow IHL.   
V. This leads to the last chapter. When confronting theory with US practice, 
there are a lot of inconsistencies, driven by the constant need to keep the program a 
secret. As for signature strikes they represent some of the biggest issues with the 
American drone program.  
There is no public knowledge of what is considered a signature behavior. If we 
believe the reports and the US is carrying strikes to all military-age males in the area 
of known terrorists (basically until proven innocent) the repercussions on the tole of 
civilian casualties could indeed be a lot higher than they made us believe.  
Lack of a disclosed targeted killing policy, whether referring to personality 
strikes or signature strikes, leads to a void of accountability. If, indeed the US is 
engaging in this attacks under the laws of war, there is no problem to reveal which 
behaviors amount to a lawful attack.   
VI. Without a public policy about the drone program, specially the CIA’s, a 
sort of fog covering the lawfulness of these attacks, leads us to be more incline to 
accept the media and Human Rights Organizations reports, and share their concerns.  
If proven, it would mean that serious violation of the principle of distinction 
had occurred. As the US should not take these accusations as lightly as it appears for 
almost two decades. In an unprecedented ruling, the Peshawar High Court, is 
Pakistan, ruled the strikes conducted by the CIA, that occurred in the tribal areas a 
“breach of International Law and Conventions on the subject matter”, demanding 
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compensation for the civilian casualties and property damages as well as further 
investigations in to the nature of the attacks199.  
Of course, Pakistani entities weren’t able to up hold the ruling, especially when 
it comes to the US and the CIA. But, the simple existence of this decision it is an 
evidence of the need of transparency when conducting these operations.  
VII. With these actions the US is at risk of establishing a dangerous precedent 
for future drones and/or targeted killing programs, instead being an example of 
transparency and compliance with IHL.   
To believe that this technology will remain exclusive accessible only to 
“responsible nations” is to disregard the history of technology itself200. It should not 
be acceptable that, after all this years, there is still this level of secrecy surrounding 
these practices.  
So, the US should be setting the example and public disclose the rules applied to 
their drone program. Only by doing that, the international community could hold the 
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